



---

## ***The Shift from Strategic to Managerial Paradigms: A Theoretical Foundation.***

*Saiti Aboubakr* صبيتي أبوبكر

أستاذ محاضر أ - قسم علوم الإعلام والاتصال بجامعة غرداية ، الجزائر

Lecturer A, Department of Information and Communication Sciences, Ghardaia University, Algeria

[saiti.aboubaker@univ-ghardaia.edu.dz](mailto:saiti.aboubaker@univ-ghardaia.edu.dz)

---

### **Abstract**

The evolution of strategic and managerial thought has undergone multiple stages, culminating in the term "strategic management." This concept arose in response to the accelerating transformations in business environments and the increasing need for comprehensive visions capable of anticipating future challenges and formulating effective decisions. The convergence between these two fields reflects an intellectual progression aimed at transcending traditional administrative boundaries toward adopting a more dynamic and holistic perspective. Strategic management has thus become a methodological framework that enhances the organizational capacity to adapt to rapid changes while maintaining a sustainable competitive advantage.

Moreover, the reciprocal relationship between strategic and managerial thought has given rise to diverse approaches for understanding planning, execution, and evaluation processes within organizations. This interaction has led to the developing of integrated analytical and practical models, reshaping core concepts such as vision, mission, and long-term objectives into essential components of modern management practices. The influence of strategic management extends

beyond the economic sphere to include public and non-profit sectors, reflecting the broad applicability and impact of its principles.

This article explores the intersection of managerial and strategic thought, emphasizing the integration of strategic concepts into administrative sciences. By tracing the evolution of both classical and contemporary strategic approaches, the study seeks to establish a conceptual foundation for strategic management, highlighting how organizations adapt to dynamic environments and implement strategic principles in their decision-making processes.

**Key words;** Strategic Management, Managerial Thought, Organizational Adaptation, Strategic Planning, Conceptual Integration

## **Introduction**

The most important schools and theories that studied the concept of management from its various aspects, it can be said that they differed among themselves in many matters, and at the forefront of these differences is the nature of the approaches adopted by each school or theory, although we see that the pioneers of these schools also differed in understanding, interpreting and defining the content of management, its principles and even its meaning, and we also see that some schools practiced a break spontaneously, as they ignored the results of the schools that preceded them, although logic requires that the position of all researchers and pioneers in the field of management be justified through the environment, circumstances and period in which they lived in order to establish their theories, and from the researcher's point of view, it can be said that no modern theory in management can do without taking into account the assumptions of the systemic school and the situational school while dealing with the problems

---

facing management science based on the basic concepts that crystallized through the stages of development of administrative thought. Despite the continuous changes in the field of administrative thought that crystallize in a set of modern concepts that seek to keep pace with different environments, modern methodologies for this thought have emerged in parallel, drawing their foundations from other fields, areas, and sciences. In addition, contemporary organizations will not achieve their goals except within the framework of a clear future vision toward anticipating prospects, where organizations find themselves faced with a single option, which is to adopt a strategy that includes all the frameworks and dimensions of the organization and its capabilities towards what is coming, which will support the options of any organization in adopting strategic thought.

This article aims primarily to try to clarify the modern convergence that administrative thought has reached towards implementing the concepts of strategic thought in the heart of management through methods of employing traditional or contemporary concepts of strategy and strategic thought, which may contribute to some extent to crystallizing an intellectual foundation for the term strategic management. From this standpoint, the problem of this article will revolve around explaining the nature of the convergence between administrative thought and strategic thought. Strategic thought, including strategy, has gone through many historical stages. Over the ages, different strategy concepts have crystallized, each according to the field in which they were known. Accordingly, strategic thought was established, which included many trends, and many models emerged from it. This paved the way for the emergence of contemporary strategic thought, one of whose sources was a convergence towards administrative thought.

### **I) Roots of the concept of strategy and models of ancient strategic thought:**

#### **I) Roots of Strategy:**

The concept of strategy dates back to ancient Greek civilization, where it was derived from the Greek word "Strategies," which means the science of the general. Accordingly, this concept is

---

ancient in human thought. The specific uses of this word in that historical period indicate that the word "general" describes a personality consisting of three dimensions: (Al-Qatamin, 2002, p. 15)

**1) The first dimension:** The general is the person who acts decisively, as the job description of his role is to choose the most appropriate path promising to achieve a competitive experience. The meaning behind this idea stems from the fact that winning or losing battles is due to the generals who manage them by making correct or incorrect decisions in the process of employing the appropriate quantity and quality of capabilities (linking the objectives and the general's strategic capabilities in the decision-making process).

**2) The second dimension:** The general is the person who acts while knowing that he is not in a vacuum and that other forces around him affect and are affected by his way of acting and making decisions, and thus, these forces exert pressure on the results he seeks to achieve. He is a person who is well aware that he must monitor all events, big and small, and follow up on the strategic deliberations taking place on the battlefield among opponents and allies alike. He also analyzes what is said by his high command and among the ranks of his troops. He is a person who realizes that he has important roles to play in order to resolve the conflict in a way that leads to achieving his goals.

**3) The third dimension:** The general is the person who has a deep sense of time and when he should act. He studies his plans and strategic movements in-depth and implements them at the appropriate times to yield the desired results.

Thus, it is clear from the above that the ancient Greeks understood strategy as being based on three pillars:

**A) Importance:** This means that strategy deals with decisions and issues of utmost importance without other issues with tactical dimensions.

**b) Comprehensiveness:** The strategic action is characterized by being broad in scope, dealing with the general framework of movement towards the future, and performing broad-minded roles.

**c) Long-term future outlook:** The strategy's actual scope of application is in the future, meaning that it is implemented over a timeline that begins now and extends into the future for many years.

Thus, the concept of strategy is old in history. However, practical interest in it outside the framework of wars and the generals who led them did not appear until the past few decades, as the interest of researchers and business people in this concept increased with the beginning of the fifties of the twentieth century and during this period the concept of strategic planning developed and then the concept of strategic management.

The credit for the development of this concept and its subsequent applications in management goes to two people:

- **First:** "Chester Barnard," a senior employee at the American Telephone and Telegraph Company;

- **Second:** "Alfred Chandler," a university professor at the Harvard Business School.

Without prior coordination between them, they were able to complete the circle. The practical experience that Barnard gained from work was combined with the scientific, systematic approach of the university professor Chandler and was the starting point for what was known as: "strategic management."

## **I.2) Definition of Strategy**

The concept of strategy has many definitions, and of course, what is meant by strategy depends on the accepted definition. It was defined as "the plans and activities of the institution that are developed in a way that ensures a degree of compatibility between the mission and objectives of the institution and between this mission and the environment in which it operates in an effective and highly efficient manner" (Bin Habtour, n.d., p. 31). We note here that strategy is a means to achieve a specific goal, which is the mission of the institution, as Drucker defined it as "analyzing the current situation and changing it if necessary, including determining the nature and amount of resources" (Al-Rikabi, 2004, p. 25). He emphasized that strategic analysis is the true beginning of strategic thinking.

Chandler defined it as "determining the basic long-term goals of the institution, by adopting executive plans and allocating resources to achieve them" (Sawakri, 1996, p. 32). Hence, strategy is based on determining the future image of the institution (LE QUOI), and what it should be, not how to reach that, which is within the scope of strategic planning.

As for strategy, according to (Ansoff), it is: "The organization's vision of the nature of the expected relationships with the external environment, in light of which the type of work that must be carried out in the long term is determined, and the extent to which the organization seeks to achieve its goals and objectives is determined" (Al-Douri, 2005, p. 25). That is, the strategy is linked to the external factors of the organization without the internal ones, as the organization's relationship with the environment is determined in the form of (product/market).

According to Ansoff, strategy is: "The organization's vision of the nature of its expected relationships with the external environment, in light of which the type of work to be undertaken in the long term is determined, and the extent to which the organization seeks to achieve its goals and objectives is determined" (Al-Douri, 2005, p. 25). That is, strategy is linked to the

---

organization's external factors rather than its internal ones, as the organization's relationship with its environment is determined in the form of a (product/market). K. Andrews, a pioneer of the Harvard Business School, defined strategy as "concerned with the success of the organization and includes the selection of objectives, the adaptation of organizational capabilities, and the mobilization of resources to achieve those objectives" (Souakri, pp. 32-33). Accordingly, the Harvard School's conception revolved primarily around the essence of strategy as the content of decisions rather than the process of formulating them. It also emphasized that strategy involves establishing monitoring mechanisms (feedback) to achieve control, adaptation, and change over time.

What constituted a qualitative shift in the concept of strategy was the proposal of Minichiello-Curran-Macgarthy, who defined strategy as "the analysis of the environment and the selection of economic alternatives that reconcile the organization's resources and its objectives at a level of risk justified by profit and the possibility of achieving the alternatives themselves" (Al-Rikabi, p. 29). Here, they considered that objectives are not an element of the concept of strategy but rather fall within the steps of strategy formulation. This is what Steiner-Miner believed, adding that the analysis includes not only the external environment but also the internal environment of the organization. They also added the step of "strategy implementation" to the strategy formulation steps.

In 1979, Mintzberg defined strategy as "a mediating force between the organization and its environment, and a pattern of adaptive decisions made within the environment" (Al-Douri, 2005, p. 25). It appears that the level of these decisions is strategic, ensuring that the organization is aligned with its environment. Here, he emphasized that the task of strategy also includes analyzing the internal environment to ensure compatibility and adaptation between the organization and its external environment.

---

By the mid-1980s, Michael Porter, a pioneer of competitive strategies, defined strategy as the search for a suitable competitive position within an organization's sector of activity, or wherever competition is primarily evident. It seeks to secure a profitable and sustainable position within a framework determined by the competitive forces of the sector. He also emphasized the importance of creating alignment between the organization's activities and adapting to the environment. He added that every organization has a comprehensive competitive strategy that represents a combination of the organization's defined objectives and the means by which it achieves these objectives (Porter, 1999, p. 11).

By the end of the 1980s, Mintzberg pointed out that strategy cannot be given a single concept capable of encompassing it comprehensively and in-depth. Strategy must be viewed from a new perspective that expands its scope to encompass multiple concepts, especially in light of the advent of globalization. After formulating the views of a large group of researchers, he ultimately arrived at what became known as the "Five Ps for Strategy." He believes that strategy is:

1. **A plan:** It defines policies and methods of action. It is a set of guidelines that address the situation.
2. **A maneuver:** A trick or deception to circumvent competitors. Here, policy or tactic becomes a strategy.
3. **A model:** A harmonious set of components, specifically forming a flow of activities resulting from the coherence and coordination of an organization's operations, with the goal of achieving a stable position in the environment.
4. **A position:** A means of defining an organization's position in the environment, making strategy the mediating or harmonizing force between the organization and its environment.

5. **A vision (a future viewpoint):** The content of the strategy not only includes a chosen position but also ensures an understanding of the external environment and enables the ability to see and perceive things in their correct relationship (Al-Rikabi, pp. 38-40).

Ali Al-Salami defines strategy as: "The comprehensive master plan that determines how an organization achieves its mission and objectives by organizing its advantages and minimizing its disadvantages" (Al-Salami, p. 131).

Abdul Salam Abu Qahf defines it as: "A unified, integrated, and comprehensive plan that links the competitive advantages of organizations with environmental challenges" (Abu Qahf, 2004, p. 320).

Aida Khattab defines it as: "A set of guiding plans that help management achieve its chosen path, capitalize on surrounding opportunities, and confront the constraints, threats, and risks it faces, to achieve its strategic objectives while ensuring the implementation of the specified plans and programs" (Khattab, 1999, p. 4).

Thus, after examining the most prominent propositions regarding the concept of strategy, and the differing perspectives from which strategy is viewed, we find that the differences stem from three main areas:

1. The breadth of the concept of business strategy;
2. The diversity of strategy elements;
3. The ease of the strategy formulation process.

Based on the above, we can provide the following operational definition of strategy: It is a future vision for the organization or a path that determines its direction in a way that achieves alignment between the organization and its environment to achieve a stable position

---

that enhances the organization's survival, continuity, and growth. This is achieved by adopting a "master and comprehensive plan" (this plan must respond to the opportunities and threats facing the organization, ensuring the achievement of strategic objectives using distinctive efficiency to leverage the organization's available resources) (Al-Rikabi, p. 43).

## **II) Models of Traditional Strategic Thought**

Throughout history, strategic thought has evolved through multiple stages, leading to the emergence of the following models:

### **1.II) Ancient Asian Strategic Thought (Chinese Model)**

Writing held a prestigious place in China, with a significant portion dedicated to military affairs. By the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, Chinese strategic thought began to take shape, although many of these writings have been lost today. Some of the most notable figures in early Chinese strategic thought include "Master Hsün," "Master Kuan," "Lao Zi," and "Mo Zi."

The most famous Chinese strategist, however, was Sun Tzu (Zi), who is believed to have lived in the 5th century BCE. Many historians initially ignored him, while others only recognized his influence much later. Nonetheless, serious research confirms the antiquity of his contributions to strategic thought, particularly his thirteen essays on *The Art of War*, which were widely utilized by ancient Chinese military leaders (Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, 1999, p.152).

Sun Tzu laid the foundation for an essential school of strategic thought. Several centuries later, other strategists emerged, such as General Cao Cao, one of the most prominent military figures during the Han Dynasty, and Li Quan, who served under the Tang Dynasty in the 7th and 8th centuries CE. Later figures included He Yanshi and Zhang Yu during the Song Dynasty.

---

Most of these strategists lived during the period of the Warring States, before the unification of the empire. During this time, strategic thought was divided into two major schools:

- The first school conducted in-depth analysis of the relationship between war and politics.
- The second school took an anti-militarist stance, paradoxically contributing to the development of military thought while opposing warfare, advocating instead for the right to self-defense.

Regarding global interest in this model, it was the Russians who first provided a complete translation of Sun Tzu's work, publishing it in 1860 and 1889. It was not until the early 20th century that European scholars began to show real interest in Chinese strategic thought (Ibid., p.156).

## **2.II) Ancient Western Strategic Thought (Byzantine Model)**

The Byzantines produced numerous writings on military institutions, leading to a flourishing body of strategic literature, despite their overwhelming focus on battlefield leadership above all else. However, much of Byzantine strategic heritage has been lost.

One of the most well-known strategic figures of this era was Syrianos, a judge who served as a bridge between ancient Greek and Byzantine strategic traditions. So influential was he that Emperor Constantine VII instructed his son to carry the books of Polyen and Syrianos on his military campaigns. Some anonymous strategic studies from this period are believed to have originated from Syrianos (Salāḥ Nayūf, *Introduction to Strategic Thought*, 2005, p.37, adapted).

---

Today, scholars are engaged in restoration efforts to recover lost or unidentified Byzantine strategic texts. One such initiative is the *Collection of Strategists*, which aims to identify and analyze surviving Byzantine strategic works.

### **3.II) European Strategic Thought in the Middle Ages (16th Century)**

Strategic thought in the Middle Ages was notably underdeveloped. It did not begin to take shape in any meaningful way until the second half of the 15th century. The first clear signs of military strategic thinking appeared in Spain, with the publication of *Libro de la Guerra (Book of War)* around 1420, authored by Marquis Vellena (Salāḥ Nayūf, *Previously Cited Work*, p.39-40, adapted).

In France, several authors emerged, such as Robert de Balsac, who published *Principles of Noble Conflicts* in 1502. Meanwhile, in England, Béraud Stuart wrote *Analysis of the Art of War* in the same period. In Germany, the book *Kriegsbuch (Book of War)* by Philippe von Seldeneck was published towards the end of the 15th century.

#### **1) Machiavelli: The Tactician and Strategist**

The most famous author of the 16th century was Niccolò Machiavelli, whose *L'arte della Guerra (The Art of War)* remains his only book published during his lifetime. Like his renowned work *The Prince*, Machiavelli's military writings focused primarily on critiquing the military institutions of his time. *The Art of War* had a significant and lasting impact. When analyzed alongside *The Prince*, it is clear that Machiavelli laid the groundwork for the development of a structured and institutionalized strategic thought (Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Op.Cit.*, p.180-190).

## 2) English and French Thinkers

English strategic thought suffered a significant setback after the Hundred Years' War, which created a period of isolation from the rest of continental Europe. Consequently, England saw little progress in the field and remained largely dependent on older military theories, such as *The English Military Theory of the 16th Century*. Furthermore, the English Civil War severely disrupted military thought in England, as it dragged on for an extended period.

In contrast, the French benefited immensely from the Italian Wars, which provided them with extensive military experience. This era began with the publication of *The Trees of the Roses of War* in 1502, a book commissioned by King Louis XI to educate and train his heir (Salāḥ Nayūf, *Previously Cited Work*, p.43-44, adapted).

## 4.II) Strategy in the 17th Century

The 17th century saw a proliferation of writings on tactics. The primary challenge for strategists of this era was the specialization of the field, as there was an urgent need for new methodologies that aligned with evolving military structures and battlefield strategies.

### 1) The Rise of Northern Europe

Many scholars consider the Dutch model to have significantly shifted the balance of military literature in favor of Northern Europe, which had previously been dominated by the Spanish-Italian school in the previous century. The Dutch were among the first to establish a more scientific approach to warfare and military organization.

### 2) French Military Thought

In France, Duke Rohan, a leader of the Protestant faction, published *The Complete Commander* in 1636, drawing inspiration from Julius Caesar as his model military leader. In 1663, the

---

manuscript *Book of War* by Aurignac was released, outlining the five principles of military action: militarization, movement, combat, attack, and defense of territories (Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Op.Cit.*, p.190-200).

During this period, the French also made significant efforts to translate numerous military treatises from other European languages into French, contributing to the enrichment of their strategic thought. By the late 17th century, military strategy had evolved beyond battlefield tactics into a structured discipline encompassing statecraft and national security (Ibid., p.195).

## **II) Toward the Establishment of Contemporary Strategic Thought**

The numerous currents of traditional strategic thought paved the way for the emergence of contemporary strategic thinking.

### **I) The Founding Fathers of Contemporary Strategic Thought**

#### **1.I) Jomini**

Henri-Antoine Jomini sought to reconcile the legacy of 18th-century writers with the lessons derived from Napoleon's model. With him, the true foundations of modern strategy were laid. Born in Switzerland in 1779, Jomini served in the French army and became the chief of staff to Marshal Ney in 1805. That same year, he published his first book, *Treatise on Grand Tactics or the Relation of the Seven Years' War*, which was essentially a development of an earlier work by the Prussian General Tempelhof in 1783. Tempelhof's work, in turn, had expanded on an earlier study by General Lloyd, titled *History of the Seven Years' War*.

What distinguished Jomini's work was his incorporation of modifications based on direct comparisons with the operations he had witnessed or participated in. In subsequent years, he published numerous works analyzing the Austrian wars and the Wars of the Revolutionary

---

Empire. Eventually, his writings culminated in an eight-volume series, completed in 1816. He later returned to France and passed away in 1869 at the age of 90.

The final form of his work consists of two major parts: *Analysis of Great Military Operations*, which he devoted to the wars of Frederick II, and *The Critical and Military History of the Wars of the Revolution*, a 15-volume study. Although somewhat forgotten today, Jomini remains one of the key founding figures of modern strategic thought. His influence spanned across Russia, the United States, and Europe, with translations of his work appearing in numerous languages.

Jomini had a profound impact on early American strategic theorists, including William Duane, John Armstrong, Dennis Hart Mahan, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. The American strategic tradition has rarely been as profoundly shaped by a single author as it was by Jomini (*Salah Nayouf, Previously Cited Work, p.47, adapted; Bruno Colson, La culture stratégique américaine: influence de Jomini, Paris: Ed. Economica, 1993*).

## **2.I) Clausewitz**

Carl von Clausewitz is considered today the most renowned military thinker. His famous book *Vom Kriege (On War)* is often compared to Machiavelli's *The Prince*, serving as a fundamental reference for most strategic thinkers. It is rare to find a strategic text that does not reference his work.

Born in 1780, Clausewitz gained extensive military experience through direct participation in various wars. His first strategic work was *A Deep Critique of von Bülow's System of War*. In 1806, he began preparing for his magnum opus, which he started writing after 1815, once his military career reached an impasse.

---

Clausewitz authored numerous historical studies on the military campaigns of Turenne, Frederick II, and the Revolutionary Empire. Drawing from his historical knowledge, he developed *On War*, which consists of three main books: an analysis of grand strategy, an examination of limited war, and a study of tactical operations. However, due to his sudden death, Clausewitz was unable to complete this vast project.

Clausewitz revolutionized strategic thinking by defining war as a continuation of politics by other means (*Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, Op.Cit., p.200-210*).

### **3.I) The New Clausewitzians**

Clausewitz did not publish any of his studies during his lifetime, believing that they were incomplete. After his death, his wife edited and published his manuscripts in ten volumes between 1832 and 1837. However, the initial reception of his ideas was mixed, which prevented his immediate rise to prominence.

It was not until 1870 that Clausewitz's reputation as a strategic thinker truly emerged, driven more by nationalist interests than purely intellectual ones. The victorious Prussian Empire, after its successes at Sadowa in 1866 and Sedan in 1870, sought a theoretical justification for its battlefield superiority. Jomini's theories, despite their significance, were insufficient for Prussian ambitions, particularly because he was Swiss and had once been an intelligence theorist for Napoleon. Additionally, Jomini occasionally criticized Frederick II. Clausewitz, in contrast, was a true Prussian and an ideal ideological figure for German readers.

Following Germany's military triumphs, many nations attempted to replicate the German strategic model. As a result, Clausewitz's works were translated into multiple languages. In Germany itself, *On War* became a legal reference for strategic thought, with Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen writing a preface for it in 1905.

---

However, Clausewitz's emphasis on politics as the primary determinant of war, followed by defense as a strategic preference, was met with resistance. Many admirers of his work selectively interpreted his writings to justify offensive doctrines and decisive battles.

In France, military academies translated many of Clausewitz's studies on military campaigns. However, German and French scholars remained divided over his interpretation of Napoleon's wars—French scholars argued that Clausewitz failed to analyze Napoleon adequately, while Germans generally praised his perspective (*Salah Nayouf, Previously Cited Work, p.50, adapted*).

In the Anglo-Saxon world, Clausewitz's writings encountered significant reservations. The philosophical nature of his work clashed with British pragmatism. In the United States, his theories were largely disregarded until the latter half of the 20th century.

Raymond Aron, writing in 1976, remarked on this intellectual neglect:

"Among the leading names working in strategic studies in the United States, only Bernard Brodie has deeply engaged with Clausewitz" (*Raymond Aron, Penser la guerre: Clausewitz, Vol.1, L'âge européen, Paris: Gallimard, 1976, p.347*).

### **Contemporary Strategy in the 20th Century**

In 1914, a heated debate emerged regarding the fundamental changes in military art, with a clear dominance of practical aspects over theoretical ones. Various records from this period testify to the ideas imposed by events, especially since most military officers lacked the time to write, as they were either on the front lines or in military command headquarters managing operations. This explains the near-total absence of military publications during this period. By

---

the outbreak of World War I, strategic sciences had largely fallen into oblivion. But did they disappear entirely?

In reality, many intellectuals and writers discussed strategic sciences, not in books or dedicated references, but rather in journalistic articles appearing sporadically and in non-military or non-specialized books.

By the end of 1918, theoretical strategic concepts had been rebuilt. Previous convictions and certainties collapsed with the conclusion of World War I. What became firmly established after this period was the division between those who adhered to the new military doctrine centered on continuous frontlines and the superiority of defensive operations, and the innovators who sought to capitalize on the new capabilities offered by weapons introduced during the war—most notably, tanks and aircraft (Aron, 1976, p. 347).

### **Strategic Thought in the 1930s: Between Renewal and Stagnation**

During the 1930s, there was a noticeable tendency toward rigidity in strategic thought. In Italy, General Visconti-Prasca wrote a widely recognized book titled *La Guerra Decisiva* (The Decisive War) in 1934, which was translated into German and French in 1935. In this book, the general advocated for a return to the doctrine of offense.

In France, too, conservative currents in strategic thought continued to emerge, as evidenced by General Chauvineau's book *Is Assault Still Possible?*, published in 1939, which clearly indicated the return of traditionalist views.

Similarly, in Germany, this trend expanded significantly, with numerous theorists contributing, including Wilhelm Reinhardt, Alfred Krauss, Waldemar von Erfurth, and Herman Foertsch. Regarding offensive doctrine, the Germans made significant advancements following the mass

production and deployment of both aircraft and tanks. Notably, German strategists were heavily influenced by British military theorists such as Azar Gat.

Meanwhile, in Russia, the Soviets sought to develop an original strategic theory of their own. The most renowned writer in this field was General Alexandre Svechin, whose book *Strategija* was published in 1926.

By 1939, strategic thought had evolved dramatically from its state in 1914. There was no longer a unified doctrinal consensus; rather, a deep rift had emerged between conservatives and modernists (Aron, 1976, p. 347).

## **Strategic Thought During World War II**

The war that broke out in September 1939 caused a fundamental upheaval in strategic doctrines that had prevailed between the two world wars. Strategic planning was no longer limited to small- or large-scale wars; instead, it expanded to encompass the entire world. One of the primary reasons for this transformation was the technological advancements across all categories of weaponry. Weapons increasingly dictated military strategy, and all strategic theories were tested on the battlefield.

Nevertheless, strategic thought and theorization did not disappear from European nations, as numerous theoretical strategic references and publications continued to emerge throughout the war.

The most significant development during World War II was the meteoric rise of the United States as a dominant power, which was also reflected in the field of strategic theory. Prior to this, the U.S. had not yet produced major works in strategic sciences, with the notable exception

---

of Alfred Thayer Mahan. However, the U.S. victory in World War II led to a growing interest in the theoretical foundations of strategic sciences, a field that soon gained global prominence.

American universities began developing research programs focused on analyzing and interpreting European strategic thought. For example, Edward Mead Earle launched studies on prominent European strategists in his book *Makers of Modern Strategy*, published in 1943 and later translated into French in 1982. This work remained a cornerstone reference in the field for half a century (Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre : Clausewitz, Vol. 1, L'Âge Européen*, Paris: Gallimard, 1976, p. 347).

## **The Convergence of Contemporary Strategic Thought with Management**

Contemporary strategic thought has not remained confined to the military domain; rather, its applications have expanded into numerous fields, most notably management sciences.

### **I) The Shift in Strategic Approach**

Many scholars consider military affairs to be unique, meaning they differ significantly from civilian activities. Strategy has traditionally encompassed military-related domains, such as military history and military geography. In reality, strategy has maintained a distinctive character, as even military officers who wrote on strategic matters possessed their own network of educational institutions and publishing houses. This exclusivity extended to various strategic concepts, which, according to many observers, stemmed from the same assumption—a fundamental separation between the domains of war and peace.

This traditional strategic approach faced significant criticism after World War II. The concept of strategy evolved considerably, shifting beyond its military environment. No longer was it confined solely to military considerations, especially as it began incorporating methodologies,

---

schools of thought, and analyses derived from disciplines commonly applied in civilian fields, primarily economics (notably management sciences) and political science. Since the end of World War II, particularly from 1949 onward, Bernard Brodie established links between strategy and economics, proposing a security approach based on terminology related to resources—especially scarce resources (Brodie, 1949).

## **II) The Contemporary Strategic Environment**

The transformations in strategy, as previously discussed, have been analyzed and evaluated by numerous theorists and analysts. Although military strategists remained prominent, the significant development of this period was the rise of civilian strategists such as Herman Kahn (from applied sciences), sociologists Raymond Aron and Henry Kissinger, historians Bernard Brodie and Michael Howard, economist Thomas Schelling, and political theorist Edward Luttwak.

In the United States, strategic thinking was relatively weak before World War II. However, as the war began, many civilians became involved with the U.S. military command, a trend that intensified in the late 1940s. This shift was institutionalized with the establishment of the RAND Corporation by the U.S. Air Force, which aimed to analyze the new transformations in modern armies. In practice, nearly all prominent figures in American strategic thought—except Henry Kissinger—were affiliated with the RAND Corporation.

American strategic thought was further reinforced and developed through exchanges between universities and major public research institutions, such as the Institute of Defense Analysis, the Center for Naval Analysis, and the Congressional Research Service, as well as private research institutions like the RAND Corporation, the Brookings Institution, and the American

---

Enterprise Institute. Collectively, these entities formed a genuine strategic community unparalleled elsewhere in the world.

In Britain, the country produced several influential strategic theorists, most notably physicist P.M.S. Blackett, who was among the first to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in strategic planning, and Basil Liddell Hart, who clarified many defense-related concepts during the 1950s. However, some scholars argue that due to Britain's deep ties with the United States, it was unable to develop entirely independent strategic doctrines, which ultimately influenced British strategic thought.

In Germany, the country largely disappeared from the global strategic stage following its defeat in World War II and the subsequent loss of legitimacy for its military institutions. The most significant German contributions in this field came from civilian writers such as Wolf Schneider, Erik Grawert-May, Panaiotis Kondylis, and Gunter Maschke.

In France, civilian strategic research failed to establish permanent institutions or exert real influence in practical terms. French research institutions had a marginal impact due to limited resources and, more significantly, the military's strict control over strategic planning and its monopoly on critical information. The only major French institution that shaped national strategic thought was the Center for Evaluations and Future Outlook, which was affiliated with the Ministry of Defense. French universities did not recognize "strategic studies" as a distinct academic discipline, instead subsuming it within political science, where it received limited attention.

### **III) The Contemporary Strategic Approach to Management**

The emergence of early models linking strategic approaches to management coincided with the fundamental shifts in the capitalist economy, particularly following the first oil shock (*Le 1er*

*Choc Pétrolier*), which marked the end of the "Thirty Glorious Years" (*Les Trente Glorieuses*). This period ushered in a new phase for businesses, characterized by successive and profound fluctuations and a transition from the prevailing logic of supply-driven markets to one governed by demand. As stated by Pariat and Jacob, quoting a prominent business leader, "Organizations must learn to evolve from a business logic centered on the dictatorship of supply to another that can be called the democracy of demand" (Réal & Pariat, 2000, p. 73). This perspective highlights a clear shift from traditional conflict-based competition to a modern struggle shaped by market mechanisms and competitive dynamics.

The strategic convergence toward management has primarily taken three key directions:

1. **The First Approach: A general Perspective**

Developed at **Harvard University**, this approach focuses on organizations (a micro-level perspective). The **LCAG model**, named after its founders (*Learned, Christensen, Andrews & Guth*), represents a pioneering framework in this regard. It emphasizes diagnosing internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as external opportunities and threats, as a preliminary step toward defining strategic directions. The underlying principle of this model is that strategy involves aligning internal capabilities with external pressures. This model later became widely known as **SWOT analysis** (*Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats*).

2. **The Second Approach: Industrial Economics and Competitive Forces**

Rooted in **industrial economics**, this approach primarily focuses on industrial sectors and emerged in the early 1980s through the work of **Michael Porter**. He developed the **Five Competitive Forces Model**, which places the competitive environment at the center of strategic analysis. The model assesses:

1. Existing industry rivalry

2. The bargaining power of suppliers
3. The bargaining power of buyers
4. The threat of potential new entrants
5. The threat of substitute products

The fundamental objective of this model is to identify optimal strategies for countering competitive threats and establishing entry barriers against new competitors (Porter, 1980).

Both of these approaches emphasize **external factors** (*facteurs exogènes*), particularly the business environment, as the primary determinants of strategic success. They argue that an organization's ability to adapt to external pressures and market fluctuations is the key to its competitive advantage.

### 3. The Third Approach: The Resource-Based View (RBV)

This approach finds its origins in the work of **Edith T. Penrose**, who was among the first scholars to conceptualize the firm as a collection of tangible and intangible resources. She argued that internal resources provide organizations with as much—if not more—growth potential than external factors such as customer demand or competitive pressures (Penrose, 1959, p. 75).

Penrose made a crucial distinction between the resources an organization possesses and the services it derives from utilizing those resources. She emphasized that the **variation in how firms use their resources is what differentiates them**. That is, the same resource can generate different services depending on the expertise of those utilizing it, while individual employees can develop different competencies depending on the material resources at their disposal. As she concluded, “There exists an interactive

---

relationship between human and material resources that influences the services a firm can derive from them” (Penrose, 1959, p. 78).

This theoretical foundation paved the way for a new wave of scholars who focused on internal organizational resources, thereby creating a major shift in strategic thinking. This development marked a significant epistemological break from traditional approaches and led to the rise of **strategic management** (*management stratégique*), a multidimensional framework that integrates various contemporary and classical theories, including **systems theory, contingency theory, resource-based views, and strategic thought theories**.

### **Conclusion:**

this study reveals that the concept of strategy is as old as human thought, yet its involvement in the field of management is relatively recent. The development of strategic thought has passed through multiple stages, beginning with its military roots in ancient civilizations, through the crystallization of traditional models in Asian and Western thought, and finally culminating in the establishment of contemporary strategic thought with Jomini and Clausewitz. With the development of global economic and political conditions, especially after World War II, strategic thought underwent a radical transformation, as its applications shifted to various fields, most notably management science. This convergence has contributed to the crystallization of the concept of "strategic management," which employs both traditional and contemporary strategic concepts at the core of administrative processes. This study has contributed to clarifying the trajectory of strategic thought converging with management thought. This is achieved by monitoring the historical development of the concept of strategy, analyzing the schools and intellectual trends that have shaped contemporary strategic thought, and highlighting the pivotal role of this convergence in the emergence of the concept of "strategic management." Through in-depth research into the evolution of the concept of strategy, from its

historical roots to contemporary strategic thought, we clearly discover that strategic thought has shifted toward management thought, not vice versa, despite the originality of each. This trend is evident in management's adoption of the concepts and tools of strategic thought, particularly in the context of rapid global economic transformations, which has created an urgent need for management thought to integrate with strategic thought. This combination has resulted in a modern management approach known as strategic management, an approach based on analyzing the organization's internal and external environment, defining long-term goals, developing appropriate action plans, and allocating resources efficiently to achieve these goals. This development was not a coincidence, but rather the result of an interaction between management theories and growing environmental challenges. This has prompted organizations to seek new approaches to ensure their continuity and growth in a complex and constantly changing environment. The importance of this integration lies in enabling organizations to understand their competitive environment, anticipate future challenges and opportunities, formulate clear strategic visions, and develop their competitive capabilities to achieve continuity and growth. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of the strategic approach to implementing management principles is essential for organizations' success in the contemporary business environment. This integration does not necessarily mean subordination of management thought to strategic thought; rather, it is an integration and interaction that enriches both fields and enhances their effectiveness in confronting contemporary challenges.

## References

### First – In Arabic

#### 1) Books:

1. Bin Habtour, Abdul Aziz Saleh. *Strategic Management: A New Management in a Changing World*. Amman: Dar Al-Maseera for Publishing and Distribution, 2004.
2. Khattab, Aida. *Strategic Human Resource Management in the Context of Restructuring – Mergers – Risk Sharing*. 2nd ed. [No place]: Cleopatra for Printing and Computer, 1999.
3. Al-Douri, Zakaria Mutlak. *Strategic Management: Concepts, Processes, and Case Studies*. Amman: Dar Al-Yazouri Scientific Publishing and Distribution, 2005.
4. Al-Rukabi, Kazem Nizar. *Strategic Management: Globalization and Competition*. Amman: Dar Wael for Publishing, 2004.
5. Al-Salami, Ali. *Administrative Policies in the Information Age*. Cairo: Dar Gharib for Printing and Publishing, [No date].
6. Abu Qahf, Abdel Salam. *Business Policies and Strategies*. Alexandria: The University House, 2004.
7. Al-Qatamin, Ahmad. *Strategic Management: Cases and Applied Models*. Amman: Dar Majdalawi for Publishing and Distribution, 2002.
8. Niouf, Salah. *Introduction to Strategic Thought*. Denmark: The Arab Academy, 2005.
9. Charles Hill, Gareth Jones; translated by Rifai Mohammed Al-Rifai, Sayed Abdel-Mutal. *Strategic Management: A Comprehensive Approach*. Vol. 1. Riyadh: Dar Al-Mareekh, 2007.

#### 2) Theses and Dissertations:

- Souakri, Mubarka. *Strategic Management in Public Institutions*. Master's Thesis: Management Sciences. Algeria: University of Algiers 3, 1996.

## Second – In Foreign Languages

1. **Aron, Raymond.** *Penser la guerre: Clausewitz*. Vol. 1, *L'Âge Européen*. Paris: Gallimard, 1976.
2. **Bégarie, Hervé Coutau.** *Traité de stratégie*. Paris: Éditions Economica, 1999.
3. **Colson, Bruno.** *La culture stratégique américaine: Influence de Jomini*. Paris: Éditions Economica, 1993.
4. **Penrose, Edith.** *The Theory of the Growth of the Firm*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.
5. **Jacob, Réal, Pariat, L.** *Gérer les connaissances: Un défi de la nouvelle compétitivité du 21ème siècle*. Québec: Éditions CEFRIO, 2000.
6. **Porter, Michael.** *L'Avantage Concurrentiel*. Paris: Éditions Dunod, 1999.